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JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR ADOPTING DIVERGENT
COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
ANDY C. M. CHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of the failure to become part of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") agenda,' competition law and policy and its relevance to economic
development continue to interest researchers and have been documented in-depth
by international organizations. 2 In addition, certain fundamental principles in
competition law, such as eliminating entry barriers, promoting broader market
access, or controlling market power that has been unfairly garnered, have been
incorporated into several envisioned trade treaties, including the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") and the Transpacific Partnership
("TPP"). 3  Those developments highlight the value of an active policy of
competition law enforcement as a complement to the process of trade liberalization.
To enhance the living standards in poor countries, it is typically insufficient to
simply make the people in those countries wealthier. If the business environments
*Professor Chen is currently the Chair and Professor of Law in the Department of Financial and
Economic Law at Chung Yuan Christian University in Taiwan. He has a Bachelor's degree in Law
from National Taiwan University, and a Master's degree in Law (LL.M) from Soochow University in
Taiwan. He obtained his other LL.M degree from Duke University, and a Doctor of Juridical Science
(SJD) degree from Northwestern University in the United States. His major fields of academic interest
are antitrust law and policy, economic regulations, IPRs and antirust, and law and economics. He has
published widely on antitrust and related issues in Chinese and English, mainly from the perspective of
economic analysis. Professor Chen served as Commissioner of the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission
from 2007 to 2010 before resuming his academic career. He regularly provides testimony in lawsuits
and advises the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission, regulatory agencies as well as private business.
1. Distrust between emerging and developed economies regarding the form and manner in
which competition law would be enforced was partly responsible for this failure. See David J. Gerber,
Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the Relationship, 2007 CHI. -KENT C. L. FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP 269, 272-73, http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/facschol/220.
2. For recent literature, see R. S. KHEMANI, COMPETITION POLICY AND PROMOTION OF
INVESTMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(2007), https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/FIAS+Competition+Policy+final.pdf; SUSAN
JOEKES & PHIL EVANS, COMPETITION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POWER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS 24-
31 (2008) (enumerating the successful stories of how a well-functioned competition policy could assist
emerging economies to achieve economic growth).
3. For the objectives of TTIP, See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP): TTIP EXPLAINED (2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf; SHAYERSH ILIAS AKHTAR &
VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43387, TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) NEGOTIATIONS (2014). For U.S. perspective on the objectives of TPP, see Trans-
Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, USTR.GOV, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-
objectives (last visited June 26, 2015).
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in developing economies are characterized by highly asymmetrical information
available for market transactions, or are inundated with unscrupulous business
practices because of market power protected by cronyism, any increases in income
may be substantially offset by unjustified price augmentation. For example,
studies have shown that cartels have been associated with price increases of 10%
to 45% in developing economies. 4 Potentially aggravating the problem,
approximately 3.7% of total imports to developing countries in 1997 originated
from cartelized industries.5 Therefore, how to make markets an "asset" for the
poor, including the formulation of a sound competition policy and law that fits the
needs of the emerging economies, is becoming increasingly critical for economic
development.
Various approaches have been suggested in the literature to accommodate
developmental variances into the design of competition policy in emerging
economies. For example, emerging economies may need to prioritize their
scrutiny of market misconducts in the industries crucial to their development, such
as food supplies and health care, and continue to advocate for increased
competition to stimulate popular interest in improving competition. This paper
elaborates further on the likely responses to the challenges of incorporating
developmental variances into competition policies and rules tailored to the needs
of emerging economies. 7 The paper categorizes the features that might prompt
emerging economies to adopt rules distinct from those of developed economies
into economic (e.g., smaller market scale) and noneconomic (e.g., corruption or
cronyism) features. The unique competitive problems caused by these features are
discussed in the following section. In particular, the paper examines how
developmental variances could influence the formulation of competition policies
and substantive rules and standards in emerging economies. For example, it has
been suggested that more prevalent corruption or cronyism in emerging economies
may cause cartels in those states to be more stable and market-dominating power
less likely to be challenged.8 Therefore, emerging economies should rely less on
4. Markus Kitzmuller & Martha Martinez Licetti, Competition Policy: Encouraging Thriving
Markets for Development, VIEWPOINT, Sept. 2012, at 1, 6,
https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/results/upload/Encouraging-Thriving-Markets-for-
Development Competition-PolicyViewpoint.pdf.
5. Id. at 7 n.10.
6. See Matt Fellowes, Making Markets an Asset for the Poor, I HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 433,
445-55 (2007) (proposing schemes that allow governments in emerging economies to curb price
increases due to higher supply costs, unreasonable business conducts, and less transparent business
environment).
7. For the definition of emerging economies or developing economies, see Data: Country and
Lending Groups, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last
visited Jan. 17, 2015).
8. See D. Daniel Sokol & Andreas Stephan, Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing
World Competition Agencies, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 137, 144 (D. Daniel Sokol et
al. eds., 2013) (arguing that in many developing countries, a competition agency may "lose funding or
an agency head if the agency enforces the competition law against a politically well-connected family
firm."); Philippe Brusick & Simon J. Evenett, Should Developing Countries Worry About Abuse of
Dominant Power?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 269, 279 (2008) ("[E]ven if the competition law provides for a
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potential market entrants to address inefficiency from anticompetitive business
arrangements.
This paper concludes by raising certain limitations for the preliminary
findings. From a policy perspective, continual efforts of competition advocacy by
governments to make free competition a more widespread and favored value is
crucial for the resolutions of the competitive problems caused by the unique
features of emerging economies. The key to success is professionalism in
persuading skeptics and a transparent enforcement environment that allows public
discussion and dissemination of information. Otherwise, competition policies in
emerging economies could be misleadingly characterized by politicians as pro-
business and laissez-faire to serve their unfounded populist agendas. With respect
to the reviewing rules and standards for evaluating violations, the consideration of
developmental variance in antitrust investigations could gradually lead to a
regulatory landscape with increased focus on conduct-based reviews of the
investigated cases in emerging economies. This development benefits resource-
strapped competition agencies in emerging economies by reducing the need to
undergo the onerous effect-based evaluation process frequently required by the
rule of reason. 9 However, this could also misguide agencies to treat certain
competitively neutral conducts in developed economies as illegal per se.
Therefore, this paper proposes the following suggestions.
First, the connection between developmental variances and the unique
competitive harms to emerging markets needs to be substantiated before divergent
legal proposals are introduced. Otherwise, the emphasis on divergence could
entail the risk of over-deterrence. The probability of over-deterrence increases as
the enforcement landscape becomes more conduct-based.
Second, emerging economies have relied on their developmental variances
and domestic policies resonating with those variances to justify conduct or
arrangements that would be deemed serious violations in developed economies,
such as cartels. For example, competition law in Tunisia broadly exempts from
antitrust liability of cartels that (1) promote technical or economic progress and (2)
allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits.'0 Similarly, the Kenya
certain degree of independence for the competition officials, there can be a de facto dependence on the
wishes of politicians who might want to favor certain enterprises including state firms, firms owned by
relatives, or foreign multinationals with strong links to the political elite.")
9. In general, the rule of reason standard in competition law, particularly under U.S. antitrust
law, refers to a judicial process of determining the "reasonableness" of the suspicious anticompetitive
conduct. Under this reviewing standard, the court is required to consider and balance both the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects from the investigated business conduct or arrangement
before declaring it illegal. When applying this standard, the court is typically required to assess the
likely competitive harm from the conduct or arrangement, review its nature and duration, counteracted
by the evaluation of the alleged business justifications. Compared with the per se rule, which
establishes a violation simply by its implementation, the rule of reason requires more sophisticated
analysis of the market impacts of the conduct and is considerably more time-consuming. See EINER
ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 74-75 (2d ed. 2011).
10. Graceila Miralles Murciego, Cartel Exemptions in Developing Countries: Recent Work from
the World Bank Group, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, 2013, at 1, 7
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Competition Act allows prohibited cartels to be exempted if "exceptional and
compelling reasons of public policy" could be shown.11 In making exemption
decisions, the Kenya Competition Authority considers whether a cartel would (1)
maintain or promote export; (2) improve or prevent decline in the production or
distribution of goods or the provision of services; (3) promote technical or
economic progress or stability in any industry; and (4) provide benefits for the
public that outweigh or would outweigh the decrease in competition that would
result from the operations of the cartel. 12 This "positive" application of
developmental variance could challenge the goal of pursuing a more coherent
global application of competition law.
Finally, if complicated analytical techniques, such as market definition or the
measurement of efficiency, can be flawlessly operated, it is irrelevant whether
competition rules are based on an overly optimistic view of the self-correcting
function that potential market entrants could provide. Economic and noneconomic
features would be evaluated with substantial precision through the preference-
revealing function inherent in the "substitutability" test for market delineation.
Viewing this observation in context, equating the lack of capacity or resources to
implement sophisticated techniques employed by the developed economies with
the advantages of divergent competition policy and rules for emerging economies
may be premature. Convergence in the form of regional technical assistance to
improve the accessibility of analytical techniques and to enhance the ability of
emerging economies to implement those techniques may still be preferable. This
is particularly evident when the costs from business uncertainty occasioned by an
increasingly fragmented international enforcement structure are accounted for.
II. UNIQUE FEATURES UNDERLYING EMERGING ECONOMIES
Certain scholars have asserted that emerging economies, because of their
unique economic and institutional features, are more vulnerable to anticompetitive
activities than developed countries. '3 Default antitrust standards or rules
developed by advanced economies are frequently based on an overly optimistic
view of the degree to which the market can self-correct the competitive problems
caused by the economic interactions taking place inside it. Consequently, such
unique features of emerging economies might render those standards and rules
ineffective in emerging economies. This paper classifies those features into the
https://www.competitionpolicyintemational.com/cartel-exemptions-in-developing-countries-recent-
work-from-the-world-bank-group/.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id.
13. See Robert D. Anderson and Anna Caroline Muller, Competition Policy and Poverty
Reduction: A Holistic Approach 5 (WTO Econ. Res. & Stat. Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-02,
2013), http://www.wto.org/english/rese/reser e/ersd2Ol3O2_e.pdf (summarizing the causes of high
entry barriers because of poor business infrastructure; unnecessary regulatory and licensing
requirements that prevent the entry and success of new entrants; inadequate investment and support for
competition law policy and advocacy; asymmetries of information in both product and credit markets;
and a greater proportion of nontradable markets).
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following two groups: economic and noneconomic features.14
A. Economic Features 1S
First, in comparison with developed countries, emerging economies typically
have higher minimum efficient scale ("MES") requirements.16 Because individual
firm sizes on average tend to be smaller than those in advanced economies, the
sales required for efficient operations are also greater.1 7 This further leads to
higher market concentration ratios in emerging economies. 1 Second, industries in
emerging economies are also characterized by higher entry barriers, which result
from increased regulations and market-control measures implemented by the
governments in those countries. 19 It is still popular for governments of emerging
economies to establish tariffs that are three to four times as high as those adopted
in developed economies. 20  In small emerging economies, constraints on the
supplies of resources and skilled labor can increase the cost of market entry.
Lower population and demands make the higher MES requirements more likely to
become obstacles for potential entrants.2 1 Additionally, a higher concentration
ratio in one market could force competing entrants in a vertically related market to
enter two markets simultaneously to engage in competition.22 Capital markets in
emerging economies typically being far less vibrant than in developed economies
indicates the increased costs for entry into emerging markets.23 Namely, entry
barriers could be leveraged by existing firms to hinder competition in other
markets. From a macroeconomic perspective, emerging economies tend to be low-
income economies; therefore, the adverse effects on consumers and economic
growth from price-fixing arrangements or unilateral misconduct in emerging
economies are also larger.
B. Noneconomic Features
In addition to their unique economic features, emerging economies also vary
with developed economies in social, political, and institutional designs that could
14. This is a general classification. Fox and Gal further divided the noneconomic features into
institutional, political, and cultural/social characteristics. See Eleanor M. Fox & Michal S. Gal, Drafting
Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience 11-18 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ.
Working Paper 374, 2014), http://Isr.nellco.org/nyu lewp/374.
15. The analysis in this section is adapted from MICHAEL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR
SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 15-35 (2003).
16. Seeid. at 15-6.
17. See id. at 16-8.
18. Id. at 18.
19. See IMF Staff, Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, IMF (Nov. 2001),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm#i.
20. Id. § III.
21. GAL, supra note 15, at 15, 32-33.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries 11 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 11-
04, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract = 1761619 [hereinafter Fox, Competition].
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directly or indirectly affect the regulatory landscape of competition policy in those
states. State-owned enterprises are generally more prevalent in emerging
economies. 24 The number of regulated industries is also higher and franchise
rights are frequently granted based on cronyism.25 Therefore, connections and
social networking may be at least as valuable as entrepreneurship in securing
successful business operations. A byproduct of this phenomenon is that bribery
and corruption are more prevalent in emerging economies. 26 A society where "a
marginalized majority [is] shut out of participation in the economic life of the
community" could thereby emerge in the long term.27
Institutionally, competition enforcement agencies in emerging economies
often lack the resources and skills to effectively enforce competition law. Those
agencies are typically understaffed, inexperienced, and ineffectively governed. : s
The lack of skilled personnel results in the inability to swiftly and correctly
identify offenses or to manage complex antitrust problems.2 9 For example, civil
service systems in many countries rely on a relatively frequent rotation of staff
rather than on more stable assignments, which in turn creates the risk of
inconsistent enforcement. 30 Competition agencies in emerging economies are also
more vulnerable to political intervention, risking loss of their independence.
31
Their role as the principal government institution responsible for safeguarding
market competition may be constantly challenged and compromised by the
demands from the state to protect other policy goals that are incompatible with the
fundamental principles of competition law, but that are required to be implemented
based on political considerations. 32 In addition, the effective enforcement of
competition policy and law relies also on a judicial branch willing to protect
legitimate competitive gains from being exploited by unfair competitive means.
33
Therefore, the protection of property rights by the courts, including intellectual
24. See Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 27.
25. Id. at 44.
26. See e.g. KLAUS SCHWAB, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013-2014, at 412-13
(Klaus Schwab ed., full data ed. 2013),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFGlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf (cross-country
survey showing people in emerging economies are more likely to think that public funds are transferred
to individuals or companies due to corruption and politicians have lower ethical standard); see also
Data on Corruption, WORLD BANK GROUP: ENTERPRISE SURVEYS,
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreTopics/corruption#-7 (last visited June 21, 2015).
27. Fox, Competition, supra note 23, at 11.
28. SUBGROUP 2, ICN COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION WORKING GROUP, LESSONS TO
BE LEARNT FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG COMPETITION AGENCIES 27, 33-34 (2006),
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc369.pdf.
29. Id. at 27.
30. Vivek Ghosal, Resources Constraints and Competition Law Enforcement: Theoretical
Considerations and Observations from Selected Cross-Country Data, in COMPETITION LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 90, 101.
31. Seeid. at 101.
32. Seeid at98-101.
33. See Sokol & Stephan, supra note 8, at 152.
VOL. 43:4
2015 ADOPTING DIVERGENT COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW 385
properties and financial assets, are weaker in emerging economies.
34
III. How DEVELOPMENTAL VARIANCES AFFECT THE FORMULATION OF
COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
How developmental variances described in the previous section affect
emerging economies to make competition policies or legislation that differ from
those of developed economies can be understood from the following two
perspetives: (a) the impacts on the formulation of competition policy, and (b) the
implications for the developments of reviewing rules and standards.
A. The Impacts on Formulating Competition Policy
The aforementioned unique economic features affect the market structure and
performance of competitors in emerging economies and would generate
competitive concerns dissimilar to those of developed economies. For example,
higher MES requirements could induce firms to assert more frequently the need to
protect their status as a natural monopolist during antitrust reviews of mergers or
abusive misconduct.35 By contrast, higher concentration ratios and entry barriers
could facilitate collusion among competitors and shield a monopolist from being
challenged by potential market entrants.36 Additionally, societies with lower
incomes are typically more vulnerable to anticompetitive activities, which in turn
would aggravate problems that stem from poverty in emerging economies.37
Therefore, from a policy perspective, it would be advisable that competition
agencies in emerging economies focus more on industries that would most harm
the poor, such as anticompetitive arrangements in markets for necessities,
infrastructure, or health care.3 8
Noneconomic features, such as more prevalent cronyism, bribery, and
corruption increase the risk of distorting the application of law and unnecessary
market intervention.39 The constraints of enforcement skills and resources on
34. SCHWAB, supra note 26, at 410-11.
35. Cf The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], Session I of the
Global Forum on Competition, Imagine: Pro-poor(er) Competition Law 10, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP/GF (2013) 4 (Feb. 14, 2013) (by Eleanor M. Fox),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpd?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(20l 3)4&doc
Language=En.
36. Id at 9.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 4.
39. By taking bribes, government officials are "captured" by bribing parties. The officials would
be pressed to return the favor by sub-optimally proposing new or adjusting existing regulations or
policies to the bribing parties' benefits. In this context, corruption aggravates the problem of regulatory
capture caused by information asymmetry between the regulatory agency and the regulated industries.
As it is highly unlikely that the regulatory agency will acquire all the information required for making
optimal regulations but held by the regulated industries, "the results of regulation, in terms of outputs
and prices, remain 'second best' to those of a perfectly competitive market." Hossein Jalilian, Colin
Kiripatrick & David Parker, Creating the Conditions for International Business Expansion: the Impact
of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries-A Cross Country Analysis, in
REGULATING DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA 11, 14 (Edmund Armann
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competition agencies could exacerbate problems of ineffective or inefficient
enforcement. One of the frequently mentioned solutions to contain cronyism and
corruption is for emerging economies to continue advocating for competition to
activate popular interest in competition issues and to engage public discussion.4 °
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of competition advocacy depends on the structural
and operational problems in various countries. For example, it depends on the
scope and design of a country's competition law and the degree of power entrusted
to the competition agency that performs the advocacy.41 Advocacy effectiveness
also hinges on the structural design of competition oversight. For example, in
countries where the power of competition oversight is shared between a
competition agency and a ministerial department, the ministerial department may
be in a more influential position and able to assist the agency in performing more
effective competition advocacy.42
Additionally, to employ limited resources more effectively, competition
agencies in emerging economies may need to set priorities for investigation.
Prioritizing enforcement targets does not mean that emerging economies should
forego certain types of anticompetitive arrangement to save enforcement costs. As
Vivek Ghosal argued, emerging economies benefit from competition legislations
that cover all types of antitrust violations because their competition agencies could
thereby realize institutional scale and scope economies.43 However, this requires
the competition authorities to establish the sequence of the types of violations they
intend to investigate. For example, D. Daniel Sokol and Andreas Stephan
proposed a set of criteria for selecting the cartel cases that require more immediate
investigation and dispositions.44 Under their criteria it might be preferable for
emerging economies to prioritize domestic over international cases because of the
investigation costs assocated with prosecuting international cartels.45 Alternatively,
bid-rigging cases warrant a government's primary attention because such
investigations typically evoke more public discourse and attract broader media
coverage than other types of cartel cases.46 Strategically, competition agencies in
emerging economies could leverage this opportunity to engage in more active
competition advocacy to entrench the culture of free competition.47
ed. 2006).
40. See Susan Ross-Ackerman, Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption: Transparency,
competition, and privatization, World Bank, VIEWPOINT, Apr. 1996, at note no. 75 ("In general, any
reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy helps reduce corrupt incentives."); Frederic
Jenny, Competition Authorities: Independence and Advocacy, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION
LAW 158, 167 (loannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012.) ("Competition authorities are seen as
among the few public bodies (or sometimes the only one) that are not 'captured' and can counteract
economic lobbies [and corruption].").
41. Jenny, supra note 40, at 168.
42. Id.
43. Ghosal, supra note 30, at 97.
44. See Sokol & Stephan, supra note 8.
45. Id. at 152.
46. Id. at 153.
47. Id. at 154.
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Because low-income emerging economies would be affected by
anticompetitive practices more severely than developed economies would be,
Eleanor Fox suggested that competition authorities should set their priority for
investigation to cases that can promote social mobility and facilitate reductions in
poverty, such as those involving food, transportation, or utilities industries.
48
Moreover, because a substantial portion of the anticompetitive practices in
emerging economies are facilitated or patronized by the governments, Fox and
Deborah Healey further proposed that competition authorities should extend the
coverage of competition law and limit the scope of immunity to state actions.
49
The avoidance of market harms by unjustified state restraints should be a priority
for emerging economies.
50
B. The Implications for Constructing Reviewing Rules and Standards
Higher entry barriers and concentration ratios render the force from potential
competition that could constrain the formation of cartels and abuses of monopoly
power much weaker or even nonexistent.51 Similarly, in societies where state-
owned enterprises are widespread, legislation aiming to justify or exempt
anticompetitive activities is more likely.52 Prevalent corruption and cronyism
would also induce firms to engage more frequently in inefficient rent-seeking
activities, and thereby enlarge the welfare losses from market monopolization.
Once "networking" and "connections" with competitors and governments become
crucial to successful business operations, firms will be incentivized to seek a less
competitive environment. In other words, deviating from the agreed collusive
arrangements is not profitable for cartel members and is not expected to occur as
frequently as in developed economies. In this context, some of the successful
mechanisms for detecting cartels, most notably the leniency program,53 may not be
effectively implemented in emerging economies. Finally, a resource-constrained
enforcement agency lacking the capability and skills to investigate and prosecute
anticompetitive practices could exacerbate the aforementioned problems. In sum,
these unique economic and noneconomic features may challenge the application of
reviewing rules and standards established by developed economies on emerging
economies.
48. See Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: the Other Path, 13 Sw.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 211,219-20 (2007) [hereinafter Fox, Economic].
49. Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition-the Role for
Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 812 (2014).
50. Id. at 814.
51. Compare Fox, Economic, supra note 48, at 213 n.6, with Fox & Healey, supra note 49, at
769.
52. A number of countries, including Hungary, China, Lithuania, Malaysia, have laws aiming to
replace partly or entirely the application of competition law. Fox & Healey, supra note 53, at 779 n.44.
For a cross-country comparison of the extent to which state-owned enterprise and government activities
are exempted from competition law. See id at 784.
53. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/O091.pdf; Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines
and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases (EC), 2006 O.J. (C 298) 11.
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This section highlights how the unique economic and noneconomic features
affect the reviewing rules and standards for specific competition problems in
emerging economies. In particular, this section focuses on the following four most
commonly discussed anticompetitive practices: vertical restraints, merger review,
abuse of market power, and cartels.
1. Vertical Restraints
The predominant standards in developed economies for reviewing vertical
restraints, such as arrangements on resale price maintenance, allocation of
distribution markets, or tying arrangements, are substantially influenced by
considerations of efficiency. 54 The economic theory behind the efficiency
approach stresses the contribution that vertical restraints might make to address the
incentive-disparity problems inherent in a vertical relationship. In such a
contractual relationship, downstream distributors have the incentive to increase
their own profits by using strategies that could decrease the benefits of the
upstream suppliers. 55 For example, the distributors may try to evade their duties to
provide presale services to save promotional costs. However, this evading
behavior deprives suppliers of the opportunities to assist customers to be more
informed of their products or services, and thereby enhance the market demands
for suppliers' products or services. 56 As the efficiency approach has argued, the
failure to control the incentive-disparity problem may lead to diminishing
promotional efforts by distributors, which limits the availability of useful presale
product information for buyers. 7 This harms consumers, whose welfare is the
predominant interest that competition law aims to protect, including within the
United States. 58 Therefore, vertical restraints are illegal only when their market-
foreclosing effects outweigh the benefits of assisting the upstream suppliers to
54. It is fair to argue that the efficiency hypothesis of vertical restraints is attributable to a series
of theoretical and empirical studies by scholars from the camp of the so-called "Chicago School." For a
summary and analysis of those studies, see Andy C. M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive
Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 573, 575-76 (1999).
55. Id. at 578.
56. Id. at 575-76, 601-02.
57. For the economic theory on using vertical restraints to avoid this downstream "free-riding"
behavior, see Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J. L. & EcoN. 86, 91
(1960).
58. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (accepting the view that the legislative
intent of the Sherman Act was to design the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription."); Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) ("A restraint
that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not
consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law."). Despite the support from the Supreme Court,
the genuine goal of U.S. antitrust law is still an unsettling issue in academia. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande,
Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 874 (1999) (arguing that "'unfair' transfers of wealth from
consumers to firms with market power" should be the primary congressional concerns when the
Sherman Act was enacted."); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REv. 551,
624 (2012) (the legislative intent of the Sherman Act was to "secure political, economic, and individual
freedoms...").
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control the incentives of the downstream distributors to evade product quality or to
free ride on the promotional efforts provided by other competing distributors.
59
Even if vertical arrangements imposed by a specific brand supplier lead to
anticompetitive actions, the efficiency approach further suggests that the
competitive harms could be neutralized if upstream competition is maintained or
strengthened. In this context, vertical restraints are contractual profit-sharing
arrangements between a supplier and a distributor to encourage "interbrand"
competition through the restriction of "intrabrand" competition.
60
The incentive-disparity and the "interbrand vs. intrabrand competition"
hypotheses have been questioned by researchers for neglecting the market structure
in which commodities are distributed in emerging economies. 61 Unlike developed
economies where the retailing markets are typically dispersed with competing
outlets, the retailing markets in emerging economies are more likely to be
controlled by several powerful distributors that are frequently large multinational
firms. 62 For example, Bruno Dorin demonstrated how local traders of cocoa in
Ivory Coast were replaced by large multinational firms who entered the local
market by merging local exporting and processing companies. 63 As a result, local
cocoa growers had to face new transacting counterparts with increased buying
power.64 Dorin's study exposed the likely shortcomings of the efficiency approach
when applied to emerging economies. The efficiency approach evaluates the
competitive effects of vertical restraints primarily through the supplier-customer
relationship, but neglects the harms associated with an overly concentrated
intermediate market. Implicitly, the existence of interbrand competition
counteracts any anticompetitive harm from implementing intrabrand restrictions
may be too optimistic a view for emerging economies.
2. Merger Review
The economic and noneconomic features of emerging economies have several
implications for merger review.
First, a comprehensive effect-based analysis of mergers as are practiced by
developed economies may not be in the interest of the emerging economies.
59. Telser, supra note 57, at 99-105.
60. Put simply, by imposing vertical restraints, such as exclusive sale areas on distributors
belonging to the same distribution chain (intrabrand competitors), the supplier shares part of its
wholesale profits with the distributors to motivate them to compete with other chains (interbrand
competitors). The justification for employing vertical restraints to promote interbrand competition
gained judicial recognition in the widely discussed case of Sylvania decided by the US Supreme Court
in 1977. Cont'l Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977).
61. ELEANOR M. Fox & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION
LAW 298-300 (2010).
62. Id. at 298.
63. See Brumo Dorin, From Ivorian Cocoa Bean to French Dark Chocolate Tablet: Price
Transmission, Value Sharing and North/South Competition Policy, in UNCTAD, THE EFFECTS OF
ANTI-COMPETITIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT
PROSPECTS 237, 319-20 (Hassan Qaqaya & George Lipimile, eds., 2008).
64. Id.
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Rather, as was suggested by Fox and Michal Gal, several presumptions based on
clear and objective criteria may be needed to simplify the reviewing process for
mergers in emerging economies.65 How the presumptions should be determined
require policy makers to achieve a balance between the benefits of legal certainty
attained by these presumptions and the error costs from making inappropriate
presumptions. It may still be necessary for emerging economies to use economic
analysis to formulate these presumptions, and the enforcement experience of
developed economies may be helpful in implementing this analysis. 66 However,
emerging economies are cautioned against presuming mergers to be
procompetitive, as has been advocated by developed economies.67 The rationale of
presuming mergers to be legal is based on the hypothesis that any harm from
mistakenly approving an anticompetitive merger can be corrected by the force of
potential competition.68 As the unique economic feature of higher entry barriers
would imply, it is less realistic to expect this self-correcting market function to
occur in emerging economies.
Second, the limit to properly conducting economic analysis due to the lack of
enforcement skill and resources may also imply that emerging economies should
use business turnover rather than market share as the threshold for filing premerger
notifications. The market-share approach requires competition authorities to
accept the complicated task of delineating relevant markets for merger.69 The
approach is time-consuming and increases the uncertainty of merger reviews, as
well as causes substantial delays for completing the reviewing procedure.7 °
Similarly, lacking the enforcement skill necessary to conduct sophisticated
economic analysis may justify the tendency of emerging economies to rely more
often on "behavioral" rather than "structural" remedies as conditions for clearing a
merger.71 Structural remedies, such as divesture of the corporate assets of merging
65. Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 49-50.
66. Id. at 50.
67. See id. at 19.
68. Intellectually, this view reflects a policy suggestion originating from the error-cost analysis of
antitrust enforcement. Given the vulnerability to error of antitrust enforcement, this policy suggestion
argues that "false negatives" caused by under-enforcing competition law should be preferred to "false
positives" from over-enforcing it. Central to this observation is the belief that pro-competitive business
arrangements mistakenly condemned represent a permanent and irreversible loss to the market.
Alternatively, anticompetitive behavior erroneously allowed will be self-corrected by the market if the
competitive force, including force from potential competition, in subsequent market interaction is
maintained. This proposition has substantially changed the views of the United States judiciary toward
several types of competitive activities initially considered illegal in the past several decades. See Alan
Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 79, 83-85 (2010).
69. ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP NOTIFICATION & PROCEDURES SUBGROUP, SETTING
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS FOR MERGER REVIEW 4-5 (2008),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/do326.pdf.
70. Id.
71. MASSIMO MOTTA, MICHELE POLO & HELDER VASCONCELOS, MERGER REMEDIES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: AN OVERVIEW 11 (2002),
ftp://ftp.igier.unibocconi.it/homepages/polo/RemediesMPVI 0.pdf.
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parties, impose a heavy burden on competition authorities.72 The agency is
required to evaluate the scope of the assets that need to be divested and whether
the divesture could restore the market competition that is likely to be reduced after
the merger. 73  Structural remedies are typically irreversible, and thus entail
substantial sunk costs if wrongly implemented, which causes the implementation
of this mechanism to be even more challenging for emerging economies.
74
Third, buyer power as a countervailing factor for assessing the competitive
effects of a merger is less critical for emerging economies than it is for developed
economies.75 The existence of market power at the buyer's market may force
suppliers to lower their prices to more competitive levels, which benefits buyers
and final consumers.76 In particular, when only several suppliers dominate the
upstream market, the exercising of this buyer power against monopolistic or
oligopolistic suppliers may benefit efficiency and consumer welfare. 77
Nevertheless, buyer power being a countervailing force against the potential
increase of seller's post-merger market power is less credible if the entry barrier at
the seller's market is high. In an upstream market where potential suppliers face
insurmountable entry barriers, concentration-increasing mergers would also
increase the costs of a powerful downstream buyer if they refused to interact with
the merging firms because fewer alternatives would be available to the buyers to
leverage the countervailing force on the merging firms.78
72. The burden from implementing structural remedies such as corporate divesture originated
mainly from the problem of informational asymmetries and incentives of the parties not in line with the
objective of restoring competition. MOrTA, POLO & VASCONCELOS, supra note 71, at 6.
73. 1d. at 3, 7.
74. The complexity of implementing divesture remedies could be evidenced by the promulgation
of remedy guidelines issued by both the U.S. Department of Justice and E.U. Commission. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST DIvISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES (2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf; Commission Notice on
Remedies Acceptable Under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and Under Commission Regulation
(EC) No 802/2004 (EC), 2008 O.J. (C 267) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1022(01)&from=EN.
75. For buyer power being used as a countervailing factor in merger review, see U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 8 (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/attachments/merger-review/100 8 19hmg.pdf; Guidelines on the
Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings (EC), arts. 64-67 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, 12, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02)&from=EN.
76. John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1485, 1494
(2012); see also Peter Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive
Effects ofDiscrimination among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271, 330-31 (2008).
77. Kirkwood, supra note 76, at 1500-01.
78. See CATALIN STEFAN RUSU, EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: THE CHALLENGES RAISED BY
TWENTY YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE 180 (2010) ("[T~he Commission will regard buyer
power as being sufficiently strong and providing adequate countervailing force if purchasers have the
ability to develop alternative suppliers.... The key factor in this assertion is the sufficiency of the
countervailing power as embodied in the relative degree of dependence of one party on the business of
the other.") In addition, the effectiveness of using buyer power as a countervailing force depends also
on whether the brand of the merging firm is strong. If the merging firm holds a brand that is highly
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3. Abuse of Market Power
The first and immediate implication is how the economic and noneconomic
variances may affect the view toward the reviewing standards for abusive cases in
emerging economies. In most jurisdictions, unilateral abusive conducts by a
monopolist are not illegal per se. Antitrust reviewers would need to conduct a
tradeoff between the pro- and anticompetitive effects arising from this conduct to
evaluate the overall market impacts, and to reach final legal conclusions. In
antitrust literature, a debate exists regarding the standards for conducting this
tradeoff. The total welfare test investigates the aggregated welfare changes caused
by abusive conduct on the premise that the law treats all members in a society
equally.79 Therefore, a price being increased because of a monopolist exercising
its market power may not immediately justify the prohibition of this conduct
insofar as the efficiency gains from the conduct, such as cost reduction to the
monopolist, outweigh the associated deadweight loss to the society.80 The harm
incurred by consumers from higher prices is treated as a wealth transfer to the
monopolist, and would not be factored into the analytical process by using the total
welfare test.81 By contrast, the consumer welfare test asks whether efficiency
gains could be realized without diminishing the benefits or "surplus" initially held
by consumers.8 2 The standard assumes the interest of the consumer to be the
ultimate goal pursued by competition legislations. 83 It further suggests that
exclusionary conduct violates antitrust laws "if it reduces competition without
creating a sufficient improvement in performance to fully offset these potential
adverse effect[s] on prices and thereby prevent consumer harm., 84 Namely, if
consumers are worse off because of the implementation of an alleged practice, the
practice should thus be prohibited, even though it would generate net welfare-
enhancing outcomes.
Although each of the reviewing standards is theoretically persuasive, none of
recognized and favored by consumers, it would be more difficult for a powerful buyer to threaten to
switch to other suppliers. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 809-10 (2005).
79. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 110-
12 (1978). Although Bork used the term "consumer welfare" to describe his idea regarding the
legislative goal of the Sherman Act, the major American antitrust legislation, he was not referring to the
"protection of consumers" or the maintenance of a "consumer surplus." Rather, it was the overall net
effect from the alleged practices that he deemed crucial. Id.
80. This is the famous "Williamson Tradeoff' in antitrust economics, initially proposed by
Williamson to evaluate the welfare effect of mergers. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 22 (1968).
81. Id. at 22,28.
82. Although the term "consumer welfare" has been widely used by antitrust commentators, what
constitutes a "consumer" using this test has never been precisely defined. See Gregory J. Werden,
Consumer Welfare and Competition Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH:
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 11, 13-15 (Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber, & Rupprecht Podszun eds.,
2011).
83. Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329 (2006).
84. Id. at 330.
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them are analytically perfect for all types of abusive or exclusionary conduct. A
more pragmatic and realistic view might be to treat the selection of reviewing
standards as a dynamic process that varies with the conduct and market structures
involved in individual cases.8 5 Under this dynamic view, it is the error costs from
the application of the selected reviewing standard that are decisive for the
determination of selection. 6 For example, the consumer welfare standard may
neglect the efficiency gains realizable by a monopolist who is incentivized to
innovate more aggressively by the additional market shares it will gain from
innovation. Accordingly, the consumer welfare standard has the potential to over-
deter welfare-enhancing conduct.8 7 Nevertheless, this concern of over-deterrence
is minimized when market power is predominantly gained through cronyism and
rent-seeking activities, and is less likely to be challenged by potential competitors
because of the protection of state-granted franchises. Therefore, it may be
justifiable for emerging economies to adopt the consumer welfare standard.88
Additionally, the prevalence of anticompetitive harms associated with the
problems of limited enforcement resources and skills may also imply that
emerging economies should adopt revised and, preferably, simpler antitrust rules.
A comprehensive rule-of-reason analysis involving the delineation of relevant
markets and assessment of exclusionary effects is not only unnecessary, but also
often beyond the enforcement capacity of emerging economies. For example, the
current U.S. rule on predatory pricing requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant is capable of recouping the predatory losses in the post-predation
period.8 9 This requirement imposes an onerous burden of proof on the plaintiff and
has in reality made it extremely difficult for the plaintiff to prevail in price-
predation cases. The theory underpinning the recoupment test is based on an over-
optimistic view towards the degree to which potential entrants in the post-
predation period could eventually make the recovery of the losses incurred during
the predation period unlikely.90 Therefore, predatory pricing is an unprofitable and
irrational strategy. Nevertheless, it may not be necessary to undergo this
complicated reviewing process if the entry barrier in emerging economies is high
and post-predation recoupments are more likely to succeed. Similarly, U.S. courts
tend to be more reserved in intervening in refusal-to-deal cases, particularly in
cases involving regulated monopolists. 91 The rationale for this enforcement
85. See Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and
the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 441 (2006) ("[Clourts do
not implement Section 2 through a single legal test. Rather, Section 2 courts often apply different
liability tests to different conduct.").
86. Id. at 448-49.
87. Id at 465.
88. Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, in ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMICS 82, 105-06 (Hylton ed., 2010).
89. See Fox, Competition, supra note 23, at 9; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210 (1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardware Lumber Co.,
549 U.S. 312, 312 (2007).
90. Fox, Competition, supra note 23,at 9.
91. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409-10
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tendency is the concern that overactive intervention by competition tribunals to
impose the duty to deal may reduce firms' investment incentives in the future.
92
Again, such a rationale might become less relevant if market power is gained
mainly through cronyism and inefficient rent-seeking activities in emerging
economies.
4. Cartels
Studies have shown that the competitive harms caused by cartels to emerging
economies may be more damaging than those to developed economies, and that the
enforcement of competition law could effectively reduce anticompetitive effects.
93
However, because of the restraints on enforcement skills and resources, the
enforcement rules for cartels should be as clear and straightforward as possible.
One likely approach is to adopt a "white-and-black" list enumerating the type of
conduct that would be considered illegal, and make this known to businesses.
94
This approach is particularly necessary for emerging economies to successfully
resolve the problem of establishing the existence of a collusive agreement among
competitors. The methods developed by developed economies may be too
complex to be implemented by emerging economies. This is particularly true when
collusive agreements can be inferred only from economic circumstantial
evidence.95 The degree of complexity of the economic analysis involved in this
determination is frequently beyond the professional capacity of the competition
authorities in emerging economies.
IV. LIMITATIONS FOR FORMULATING DIVERGENT COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
The previous analysis demonstrated how developmental variances interact to
foster unique market conditions and structures in emerging economies. The
implications for the formulation of divergent competition policies and laws in
those countries should be duly acknowledged. In particular, they caution against
an uncritical acceptance of the enforcement philosophy and rules for market
(2004).
92. Fox, supra note 23, at 10.
93. See Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 39.
94. Id.
95. In practice, direct evidence, such as documents that identify an agreement and the parties
involved in it, or oral or written statements of cartel participants describing the operations of the cartel
are typically unavailable. As a result, circumstantial evidence, such as communications among cartel
participants or economic evidence concerning the market structure in which concerted actions are
taking place, as well as the conduct undertaken by participating members suggesting collusion, may
play a crucial role in proving the existence of collusive agreements. However, economic circumstantial
evidence can be difficult to interpret and can be ambiguous, consistent with either concerted or
independent action. It requires careful and detailed economic analysis to reduce the probability of
making incorrect inference by competition authorities. For a succinct summary of the approaches used
to determine collusive agreements from circumstantial evidence, see Organization for Co-operation and
Development [OECD], Policy Brief: Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement (June
2007), http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/38704302.pdf.
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competition established by developed economies. However, implementing those
suggested divergent policies and reviewing rules and standards requires paying
attention to certain limitations inherent in the suggested proposals.
A. Transparent Enforcement Environment, Political Support, and
Competition Policy
From a policy perspective, continual efforts in competition advocacy by
governments to transform voluntary market transaction to a more widely accepted
culture is crucial to resolving the competitive problems caused by the unique
economic features of emerging economies. The key to its success is not only
professionalism to persuade skeptics, but also a transparent enforcement
environment that allows public discussion and dissemination of information.
Otherwise, competition policies in emerging economies could be misleadingly
characterized by politicians as pro-business and laissez-faire to serve their
unfounded populist agendas.
Successful advocacy also requires support from the top of the political
hierarchy to "ensure that the [competition] agency can undertake investigations
into some of the most economically powerful actors in the country or large
international investors." 96 This is critical when policy implications from unique
economic features can be symmetrically drawn to maintain policy or legislations
with anticompetitive potential. Regulatory agencies in emerging economies may
be more likely to advocate that unique economic features, such as the need to
realize scale economies, justify the implementation of some regulatory measures
that entail anticompetitive potentials. Those regulatory policy proposals are
frequently implemented through the "immunity" or "exemption" clauses in
competition law. For example, the Antimonopoly Law of the United States Virgin
Islands exempts "formal agreements between small entrepreneurs engaged in the
retail sale of the same or similar commodities for the purpose of bulk purchase of
those commodities in order to meet in good faith, competition of businesses with
substantially larger sales volumes." 9 7 To ease the likely tension between
competition and regulatory agencies in emerging economies, it is the responsibility
of the person who is politically authorized to conduct interagency coordination to
make the final decisions on interagency policy conflicts.
B. Simpler Reviewing Rules and Standards and the Costs of Over-
Deterrence and Uncertainty in Compliance
Justifying the adoption of distinct, simpler, or stricter competition rules for
emerging economies, based on the consideration of their unique economic or
noneconomic features, requires in-depth investigation of the following
preconditions.
First, the causal connection between developmental variances and the unique
competitive harms to emerging markets must be empirically substantiated before
96. Sokol & Stephan, supra note 8, at 152.
97. JOEKES & EVANS, supra note 2, at 35.
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divergence proposals are introduced. Otherwise, divergent applications of
competition law could be counterproductive and over-deterring. Simpler
competition rules to respond to unique market features and competitive problems
frequently lead to a regulatory landscape in favor of conduct-based reviewing
standards and the rule of per se illegal in emerging economies. 98 Although simpler
rules could enhance the preditability of law, they could also aggravate the risks of
over-deterrence. Striking an appropriate balance between these two competing
effects may not be simple. This potential problem is illustrated in a study by
Richman on how the diamond industry has relied on informal arbitration to ensure
contracts of diamond sales are honored by association members.99 At the core of
this self-enforcing mechanism is the penalty of group boycott, which diminishes
the reputation of the defaulting parties, as well as forecloses their future business
opportunities.100 In emerging economies where the public institutions may not be
competent or willing to properly resolve contractual disputes, the self-enforcing
function provided by the cartel-like mechansim could be particularly valuable for
the economic developments in those countries.
A more controversial problem regarding the need to apply distinct
competition rules to counteract corruption and cronyism is the beneficial effects to
market competition that corruption may unexpectedly create. Similar to the
welfare effect of rent-seeking activities, government action influenced by
corruption and cronyism may not be viewed entirely as a deadweight loss to
society. On certain occasions, governmental measures based on the consideration
of cronyism may, in effect, facilitate the entry of more efficient firms into those
markets inefficiently protected by domestic law.101 For example, a government
may grant a franchise right to enter a rigidly controlled local market to a highly
competitive international firm in exchange for its political financial support. Such
98. See Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 32 (using Mongolia law as an example); Pamela Sittenfeld,
Advantages and Limitations of Costa Rica's Experience in Competition Policy: A Benchmark for the
Rest of the Countries of the Central American Region, in COMPETITION POLICIES IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FROM CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO 145, 159 (Claudia
Schatan & Eugenia Rivera Urrutia ed., 2008).
99. Barak D. Richman, Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and Development Policy,
in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 158-59.
100. Id. at 163-64.
101. The idea that corruption may sometimes be efficient is an anathema in most policy
discussions; however, the "grease the wheels" hypothesis of corruption, in which bribery can act as a
means to address bureaucratic inefficiency, has been proposed by Leff& Bayley. See Nathaniel H. Leff,
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8 (1964); David H.
Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719 (1966). For a more
recent empirical study supporting the "grease the wheels" hypothesis, see Pierre-Guillaume Mdon and
Laurent Weill, Is Corruption an Efficient Grease? (BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/2008),
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/pdf/160134.pdf. Economists who held more reserved views towards the
hypothesis had also recognized the potential contribution by corruption to economic efficiency. For
example, a theoretical study by Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier had discovered the
"unavoidability of corruption" and proposed that corruption "should be observed as part of an optimal
allocation" when certain regulatory conditions were met. Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier, The
Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 194, 196 (2000).
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competitive benefits are particularly evident in emerging economies with sluggish
legislative procedures to make the required legal changes occasioned by new
market events. By presenting this observation, we are not endorsing a type of
"bribery competition" in emerging economies; however, as the reviewing rules and
standards become increasingly conduct-based and in favor of the per se rule, the
potential to neglect incidents with such unintended competition-friendly
consequences also increases.
Second, it is worth mentioning that the assessment of the competitive effects
from the unique economic and noneconomic features in emerging economies may
not under all circumstances be a separate and static process. Both unique features
may have conflicting policy implications that render the choice of reviewing rules
in emerging economics less straightforward. Alternatively, they may sometimes
interact in complementary ways to aggravate competitive problems. Consider first
the problem of conflicting policy implications. For example, lowering the market-
power threshold may be viewed as necessary in emerging economies to increase
the possibility that exclusionary conduct protected by cronyism would be reviewed.
However, smaller markets and the persistent need for the realization of scale
economies could make raising the market-power threshold for initiating merger
review or for allowing more exemptible exclusionary conducts in monopolization
and cartel cases reasonable in antitrust rule making. In addition, to address the
problem associated with high entry barriers, it may be advisable for emerging
economies to prefer "behavioral" to "structural" remedies because the latter may
deter new entrants, particularly foreign investors. 102 However, behavioral
remedies also require the competition authority to engage in post-merger
supervision on whether the merging parties have complied with the remedies.
10 3
This type of supervision frequently involves a substantial degree of discretion by
the competition authority, and would increase the occurrence of corruption. °4 Fox
and Gal suggested that emerging economies should minimize exemption from
competition law, particularly for industries that are treated with priority, such as
food or utility. 05 Using banking as an example, they further argued that
encouraging more banks into the market to provide loaning services can improve
competitive problems, such as a lack of vibrant capital markets in emerging
economies. 1°6 However, the reasons why governments need to control the bank
entry into capital markets is likely based on information asymmetry between banks
and investors being a more prevalent and urgent market failure in the banking
sector. Because of the general lack of sufficient investment knowledge of
depositors or investors, introducing increased levels of competition may confuse
102. SHANKER SINGHAM, A GENERAL THEORY OF TRADE AND COMPETITION: TRADE
LIBERALISATION AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS 114 (2007); see also MARCO BOTTA, MERGER CONTROL
REGIMES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: A CASE STUDY ON BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA 344 (201 1).
103. See, e.g., OECD Policy Roundtables: Merger Remedies 1, 192, DAF/COMP(2004)21 (2003),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/34305995.pdf.
104. Id. at 17.
105. Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 20.
106. Id.
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rather than enlighten them when making investment decisions.
With respect to the problem ofjoint aggravation of competitive harms, several
noneconomic features, such as cronyism and corruption, are frequently practiced
by states in a subtle manner, resorting to the unique economic features as the
justifications for their actions. A corrupt government may justify its favors
unlawfully granted to an enterprise by manipulating economic theories or studies
to support the "uniqueness" of its market and the necessity for permitting such a
favor. Taking corruption as a fact and then designing mitigating mechanisms to
implement around it may not be an effective method of counteracting corruption.
Rather, we may still need skill and professional knowledge on how to conduct
solid economic analysis to expose the distorted uses of economic theories to
prevent the competitive harms of corruption. In this regard, experiences of
developed economies may still be helpful.
Finally, although the prevailing rules and standards applied by developed
economies fail to appropriately address the anticompetitive problems facing
emerging economies, it may still be advisable to consider whether those problems
may be more effectively addressed by alternate regulatory means. For example,
the enforcement costs from proving market effects of cronyism, or the potential
risk of over-deterrence caused by removing or reducing the threshold for proving
these effects, may make anticorruption legislation rather than a reshaped
competition law the more preferable policy choice to tackle the competitive harms
generated by corruption.'0 7 Similarly, the legal compliance costs for businesses
increase as the enforcement structures of global competition law become more
fragmented. 10 8 Therefore, it is necessary to investigate in detail whether the
current reviewing rules and standards are genuinely inadequate for solving the
competition problems unique to emerging economies. In this context, George L.
Priest argued that years of experience of enforcing antitrust law in developed
economies has established a well-defined set of competition law principles that, if
appropriately implemented, could be universally applied to enhance economic
growth across societies. 10 9 If a uniform enforcement structure could reduce the
cost of legal compliance for business, then the competition law should not be
harmonized by "compromise allegedly among separately valid approaches to
107. JOSH GOODMAN, The Anti-Corruption and Antitrust Connection, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2
(Apr.2013),http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-source/aprl 3_goodman.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
108. Multijurisdictional merger review provides a good example of how significant and inefficient
compliance costs would need to be incurred by merging parties when a merger is required to be
reviewed by various competition agencies with different procedural and substantive reviewing
requirements. See ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP NOTIFICATION & PROCEDURES SUBGROUP,
SETTING NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS FOR MERGER REVIEW 4-18 (November 2004)
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc332.pdf.
109. Those principles include (a) prohibiting price fixing and market division among competitors;
(b) prohibiting mergers with monopolists; (c) prohibiting exclusionary practices through contracts or
governmental regulation; (d) adopting policies of free entry to all industries. George L. Priest,
Competition Law in Developing Nations, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at,
85-86.
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competition law, but harmonized substantively because there is a single best-
defined competition law to improve societal welfare."
' 1 0
Based on this premise, Priest further argued that a uniform competition law
serves as a template against which explanations or proposals of competition law
could be more seriously evaluated."' In addition, legal transplants by emerging
economies from the competition rules of the developed jurisdiction offer benefits
of increasing legal certainty, reducing compliance costs for businesses, and
facilitating the resolutions of cross-border trade problems among competition
authorities from countries with various degrees of development. 112 This
observation further implicates the need for re-examining the extent to which the
unique features of emerging economies could be factored into the current
analytical framework established by developed economies. It is undeniable that
high concentration ratio, infrequent market entry, high entry barriers, or rampant
corruption and cronyism deprive consumers in emerging economies of the
alternate choices that are available in developed markets. However, fewer
alternatives means that consumers in emerging economies are less likely to switch
to substitutes in response to a price increase by firms with market power either
protected by high entry barriers or unduly gained through cronyism. In other
words, unique economic or noneconomic features in emerging markets could in
theory be integrated into the market definition process, in particular the SSNIP
approach," 3 to make the relevant market narrower and the market power held by
the actors more dominant. Accordingly, identical anticompetitive practices by
dominant firms in emerging economies are no less likely to be investigated and
punished than in developed economies." 4 In this context, even if a reviewing
standard is based on an unrealistic confidence in the market's self-correcting
abilities it may not affect the overall reviewing results. Neither will the debates
regarding the reviewing standards for unilateral misconducts decisive for effective
enforcement of competition law. Exclusionary conduct by a monopolist holding
formidable market power gained through favoritism in a narrowly defined market
typically indicates less innovative or cost-saving activities in the market. This
further implies that consumers' interest will be at the center of the reviewing
process regardless of what reviewing standard is applied. Namely, the "total
welfare" standard will converge with the "consumer welfare" standard.
Various challenges can be raised against the aforementioned suggestions. For
example, the current approach for defining a relevant market and market power is
110. Id.at8l.
111. Id. at 80.
112. See Michal S. Gal & A. Jorge Padilla, The Follower Phenomenon: Implications for the
Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 899, 904-07 (2010).
113. SSNIP ("Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase of Price") refers to a methodology
in competition law that seeks to find the product and geographic boundaries subject to competition by
testing the substitutability among products and competing regions in response to a price change within a
specific time period. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES §1.1 (1992).
114. Id.
DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
criticized as being flawed and is not an appropriate benchmark for assessing
market power and competitive harms. 1 5 However, this is a problem common to
both emerging and developed economies. It may also be premature to equate the
lack of enforcement resources and skills to conduct the sophisticated techniques
employed by developed economies with the advantages of applying divergent rules
in emerging economies. Convergence in the form of regional technical assistance
to improve the accessibility and workability of those techniques for emerging
economies may still be preferable. 1 16 Other venues, such as the International
Competition Network ("ICN"), through its recommendation of best practices for
competition law, also offer a platform for designing a uniform analytical
framework more adaptable to the needs of countries with divergent levels of
economic development." 7 Similarly, the regular annual meetings and the "peer
review" procedure of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") Competition Committee offer member states the opportunity to discuss
and debate the effects of divergent economic and noneconomic features on the
formulation of competition policy and law." 8 Consensus regarding the most
appropriate form of market regulation may thereby be formed.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed and analyzed how developmental variance might limit
the application of prevailing competition rules established by developed
economies. First, the paper described how the unique economic and noneconomic
features in emerging economies have shaped the market structures and
performance differently from those of developed economies. Recently, those
differences have been recognized and studied by antitrust researchers. Various
proposals for formulating competition policy and law in emerging economies have
115. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets? 124 HARV. L. REv. 437 (2010).
116. The objectives of technical assistance programs include assisting emerging economies in
resolving problems concerning institutional designs, dealing with international business and legal
practices, and providing educational and consulting programs that enable staff and officials to more
efficiently and consistently implement competition policy and law. Michael Nicholson, D. Daniel
Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Technical Assistance for Law and Economics: An Empirical Analysis in
Antitrust ICampetition Policy, (Food Sys. Res. Grp. Working Paper Series FSWP2006-07, 2006),
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/fsrg/publicationsWP2006-07.pdf. The effectiveness of technical assistance
depends on several factors that are closely related to the unique economic and noneconomic features of
emerging economies. Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 63-64. The effectiveness also varies with the
political power that has been assigned to the competition agencies in emerging economies. For
example, one of the critical findings of an empirical study conducted by Sokol and Stiegert is that
agencies with a leader that ranks as minister or higher and that enjoy prosecutorial discretion most
effectively accept assistance. D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Exporting Knowledge Through
TechnicalAssistance and Capacity Building, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 233,250(2010).
117. For a comparison of the similarities and differences of the ICN and the OECD Competition
Committee, see Frederic Jenny, The International Competition Network and the OECD Competition
Committee: Differences, Similarities, and Complementarities, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND ASPIRATIONS 93, 102-04 (Paul Lugard ed.,
2011).
118. OECD, Peer Review, http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/ (last visited June 21, 2015).
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been made to address the competitive problems attributable to these unique
features. Those proposals suggest that the competition policies and laws in
emerging economies be simplified to reflect the prevalence of competitive harm
and constraints on the enforcement capabilities in those countries. We noted at the
end of this paper that the suggested proposals could render the regulatory
landscape for competition law in emerging economies more conduct-based and
move it toward per se rule. While divergence between emerging and developed
economies should be duly acknowledged, policy makers should also be alert to the
possibility that simpler and stricter rules increase the risks of over-deterrence.
Therefore, this paper pointed out the limitations and conditions that must be
assessed before implementing these proposals, and emphasized that the value of a
uniform competition rule should not be discounted simply because of the existence
of certain economic or noneconomic features in emerging economies. Arguments
for formulating distinct competition rules or standards based on those
considerations should be tested against the feasibility of factoring those unique
features into the existing framework. Otherwise, costs from business uncertainty
could offset the benefits realized through the divergent application of competition
law.

